

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 141355Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6295
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
US MISSION IAEA VIENNA 313

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 0657

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ENRG, CA, IN
SUBJECT: INDO-CANADIAN NUCLEAR TALKS - NO SUCCESS IN ROUND
II

SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S ADVISOR IVAN HEAD WAS IN INDIA JANUARY 3-8 TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLVING THE INDO-CANADIAN DISPUTE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE CANADIANS PROFESS SOME SATISFACTION WITH THE TALKS AND ANTICIPATE ANOTHER ROUND IN OTTAWA WITHIN A MATTER OF WEEKS. THE INDIANS DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM, BUT WILL CONTINUE THE TALKS. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE TWO CONFLICTING POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. THE CHARGE CALLED ON CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER J.R. MAYBEE ON JANUARY 13 TO OBTAIN MAYBEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE CANADIANS AND INDIANS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION. PREVIOUSLY THE EMBASSY HAD OBTAINED SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS OF THE OUTCOME FROM A CANADIAN AND AN INDIAN WORKING LEVEL SOURCE. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS A COMPILATION OF THE EMBASSY'S DISCUSSION WITH THREE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, MAYBEE, CANADIAN FIRST SECRETARY LOUIS DE SALABERRY, AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (MEA) DIRECTOR FOR DISARMAMENT, K.P. JAIN.

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2. THE GENESIS OF THE HEAD VISIT WAS IN TALKS BETWEEN CANADIAN ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY MICHEL DUPUY AND KEWAL SINGH AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK LAST FALL, BUT IN SOME RESPECTS THE VISIT WAS HEAD'S OWN INITIATIVE AND IS RELATED TO AN ASSESSMENT OF CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD HELD BY PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU. IN THIS CONTEXT THE CANADIANS SEE THE DISPUTE OVER NUCLEAR MATTERS WITH THE INDIANS AS INHIBITING BOTH CANADA'S OBJECTIVE OF GAINING INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE INDIAN REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH THE MOST TECHNICALLY ADVANCED NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE. THE HEAD MISSION WAS DESIGNED TO BE AND WAS IN FACT PURELY EXPLORATORY. THE CANADIANS POINTED THIS OUT TO THE INDIANS AT THE FIRST MEETING WHEN HEAD EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE CANADIAN AND INDIAN POSITION COULD BE RECONCILED. HEAD ALSO WANTED TO GET A FEEL FOR THE CLIMATE AS RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE INDIANS WOULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER TOTAL CANADIAN OVERSEAS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM THAN NOW CONTEMPLATED.

3. THERE WERE TWO PLENARY SESSIONS AND A WORKING LUNCH. THE CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED HEAD, DUPUY, HIGH COMMISSIONER MAYBEE, DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER JENKINS, AND DE DALABERRY. THE INDIAN SIDE WAS COMPOSED OF AEC CHIEF HOMI SETHNA, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARY P.N. DHAR; SECRETARY V.C. TRIVEDI (EAST), JOINT SECRETARY J.S. TEJA (AMERICA DIVISION) AND JAIN FROM THE MEA, PLUS V. MECKONI, JOINT SECRETARY FROM ATOMIC ENERGY. THE FIRST MEETING ON JANUARY 4. WAS LARGELY GENERAL WITH THE CANADIANS SPELLING OUT THE EXPLORATORY NATURE OF THEIR MISSION AND THE INDIANS RESPONDING BY ASKING IF THE CANADIANS INTENDED TO DEFAULT ON THE RAJASTHAN ATOMIC POWER PROJECT (RAPP) AGREEMENT. THE INDIANS INITIALLY ATTEMPTED TO LIMIT THE DISCUSSION TO THE RAPP PROGRAM. THE CANADIANS MADE IT CLEAR THEY WERE CONCERNED WITH BROADER GUAGE QUESTIONS.

4. EXPORT CONTROLS: CANADA PRESSED AGAIN FOR A PUBLIC UNDERTAKING BY INDIA ON THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY. THE INDIANS WERE RECEPTIVE, BUT SAID THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT. SETHNA SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE INDIAN CONFIDENTIAL

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EXPORT CONTROL LIST IS MORE STRINGENT THAN THE IAEA TRIGGER LIST. THE INDIANS CONTEND THAT ALL OF THEIR CO-OPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES COVER RESEARCH--NOTHING MORE. THE INDIANS TURNED DOWN A CANADIAN SUGGESTION THAT INDIA MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON EXPORTS WITH CANADA AS A PART OF A PACKAGE AGREEMENT, BUT DID SAY THEY WOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT REFER SPECIFI-

CALLY TO CANADA. OUR INDIAN SOURCE SAID THAT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPAL INDIA WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD RESTRICT ITS EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. INDIA WAS WILLING TO GIVE PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL NOT ASSIST ANY WEAPONS PROGRAM, BUT THAT IS AS FAR AS INDIA WOULD GO. (HIGH COMMISSIONER MAYBEE SAID THAT THE INDIANS RELATED CONTROLS MIGHT BE RELATED TO A PEACEFUL EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM WAS NOT SORTED OUT DURING THE TALKYUM IN FACT MAYBEE IMPLIED THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER WAS NOT DISCUSSED.)

5. FUTURE TESTING: THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ITEM TO THE CANADIANS, SUBSUMING CIRUS (SEE FOLLOWING). SETHNA SAID THERE WOULD NOT BE ANOTHER TEST "FOR A HELL OF A LONG TIME." THE INDIANS WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE ANY COMMITMENT ON TESTING AND THE CANADIANS DEPARTED WITH THE ASSUMPTION THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER TEST. THE INDIAN POSITION IS THAT TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS WILL DETERMINE FUTURE TESTS, "NOT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS." SETHNA SAID THAT INDIA WAS CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR EXPLOSIONS SAKE. HE SAID THE EVALUATION OF THE FIRST TEST WAS MONTHS BEHIND SCHEDULE. THE CANADIANS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF ANOTHER TEST TOOK PLACE IT WOULD INTERRUPT NEGOTIATIONS, OR IF A TEST FOLLOWED THE AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION THAT NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE TERMINATED. OUR INDIAN SOURCE SAID THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANOTHER TEST AT ALL.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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6. CIRUS: INDIA SEES NO REASON TO AMEND THE CIRUS AGREEMENT WHICH WAS SIGNED IN 1956. THE CANADIANS AGREE THAT DISCUSSIONS IN CIRUS WERE THE TOUGHEST ISSUE AND REMAIN STALEMATED. THE INDIANS ASK WHY THERE SHOULD BE ANY CHANGE IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAVE NOT VIOLATED. THEY REASON THAT ALTHOUGH CIRUS WAS SOURCE FOR THE PLUTONIUM FOR THE MAY 18, 1974 PNE, EVEN THE CANADIANS ADMIT THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE CIRUS AGREEMENT. P.N. DHAR SAID THAT CIRUS WAS A TOTEM, AND THAT INDIA CANNOT POSSIBLY TIE UP THE CIRUS OUTPUT. HEAD SUGGESTED A NEW COOPERATIVE PROGRAM WHICH MIGHT OCCUPY THAT REACTOR--EMPLOY ALL OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCED BY CIRUS. THE CANADIANS ARE NOT SURE THE INDIANS UNDERSTOOD THIS PROPOSAL, BUT THE INDIANS DID NOT REJECT IT.

7. RAPP: THE CANADIANS DISCUSSED EXTENSION OF THE AGREEMENT TO COVER PURSUIT, SECOND GENERATION, AND DURATION. THE INDIANS SAID IN EFFECT THEY WOULD EXAMINE THESE FACTORS AND WERE READY TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THE CANADIANS ARE

AWARE OF THE INDIAN NEED FOR ROUGHLY ONE MILLION DOLLARS

WORTH OF SPARE PARTS FOR RAPP AND THE CONTINUED NEED FOR HEAVY WATER. THE CANADIANS SEE THESE REQUIREMENTS, PLUS THE IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TOTAL CANADIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COULD

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BE RESUMED IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON MATTERS NUCLEAR, AS THE PRIMARY INFLUENCE THE CANADIANS HAVE IN PURSUING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE CANADIANS ALSO FEAR THAT INTERRUPTION OF THE RAPP PROGRAM GIVES THE INDIANS AN EXCUSE TO ABROGATE THE EXISTING RAPP AGREEMENT AND TERMINATE SUCH SAFEGUARDS AS NOW EXIST. THE INDIANS ASSERT THEY HAVE NOT BROKEN THE RAPP AGREEMENT, AND POINT OUT THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF DELIVERIES.

8. HEAD, ACCOMPANIED BY MAYBEE, ALSO SAW PRIME MINISTER GANDHI. IN THIS SESSION AND DID NOT GET DOWN TO MANY SPECIFICS, AND WAS ALSO CONFINED WITH OTHER MATTERS--CONVEYING PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S FELICITATIONS AND URGING MRS. GANDHI TO ATTEND THE SPRING COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE. HEAD DID TOUCH ON TESTING, HOWEVER, WITH MRS. GANDHI SAYING THAT WAS A MATTER FOR THE SCIENTISTS TO DECIDE. THE MEETING WAS CORDIAL, HEAD DEPARTED INDIA ON JANUARY 8 BELIEVING THAT SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN BRIDGING THE TWO COUNTRY'S DIVERGING VIEWS.

9. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION PER SE. THE INDIANS DID INQUIRE ABOUT COMMERCIAL

PURCHASES OF NON-ZANGGER LIST ITEMS FOR THE MADRAS REACTOR. THE INDIANS SOUGHT ASSURANCES THAT IF THE RAPP AGREEMENT WERE PATCHED UP THE CANADIANS WOULD NOT APPLY STRICTER STANDARDS IN EXPORTING NON -ZANGGER LIST CPEMS FOR THE MADRAS REACTOR THAT CANADA DID TO OTHER NATIONS. THE TWO COUNTRIES AGREED ON ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS IN OTTAWA "VERY SOON," OR WITHIN A MATTER OF WEEKS.

10. THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE CANADIAN CABINET WILL DECIDE WHEN THEY REVIEW HEAD'S REPORT. IN MAYBEE'S POINION, HOWEVER, THE MINISTERS WILL TRY "TO CLEAN UP THE RAPP AGREEMENT AND GET OUT." AT THE WORKING LEVEL THE INDIANS SEE NO REASON FOR OPTIMISM IN THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. THEY SEE THE CANADIANS AS SEVERLY CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE COMMENTS THEY MADE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST TEST, AND FURTHER RESTRICTED BY THE SAFEGUARDS STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN ENERGY MINISTER ON DECEMBER 20.

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11. IN OUR JUDGEMENT THE PRICE OF RENEWED CANADIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE IS FAR HIGHER THAN THE INDIANS CAN PAY. WE SEE NO PROSPECT THAT THE INDIANS WILL ADMIT EVEN INDIRECTLY TO MISUSE OF CIRUS. WE SEE NO PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT A TEST MORATORIUM. THE GAP BETWEEN INDIAN PRIDE AND CANADIAN CHAGRIN IS STILL A WIDE ONE. IT WILL REQUIRE MORE FLEXIBILITY AND INGENUITY ON EITHER SIDE THAN WE FIND AT THIS TIME TO FACILITATE A COMPROMISE. SCHNEIDER

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